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Police often come into contact with suspects who are mentally ill and who may 
resist arrest.   Research has indicated that individuals with mental illness may have 
greater difficulty understanding and responding to commands than those who are not 
mentally ill.  This two-group repeated-measures vignette study sought to determine 
whether law enforcement officers use different degrees of force with suspects who 
display overt signs of mental illness.  One hundred and forty police officers were 
randomly assigned in equal proportions to read either two vignettes involving a criminal 
act in which the perpetrators displayed signs of mental illness (experimental condition) or 
two vignettes in which the perpetrators displayed no signs of mental illness (control 
condition).   It was hypothesized that officers assigned to the experimental condition 
would use more force than officers assigned to the control condition.   It was further 
hypothesized that officers in the experimental condition would experience a greater 
degree of negative affect than those in the control condition.  Results did not support 
either hypothesis, suggesting that officers may not react differently to suspects with 
mental illness.  The hope is that this research will offer insights for police departments 
with and without use-of-force training programs. 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKING WITH SUSPECTS WHO ARE 
MENTALLY ILL: WHAT IS REASONABLE USE OF FORCE? 
Chapter 1.  Introduction and Literature Review  
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
In the United States, approximately 61.5 million adults experience some form of  
mental illness; 13.6 million of those adults suffer from severe forms of mental illness.  In 
fact, 2.4 million adults are living with schizophrenia (National Alliance on Mental 
Health, 2013).  Research from the National Alliance on Mental Health revealed that only 
a small percentage of individuals with mental illness are receiving treatment (NAMI, 
2013).  A law like the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 reduced the 
resources available for the mentally ill.  Psychiatric hospitals lost funding, and the criteria 
to involuntarily commit someone became even more stringent.  The closing of state 
psychiatric hospitals, better known as deinstitutionalization, left many people with severe 
mental illness homeless and unmedicated.   Nationally, more persons with mental illness 
are in prisons and jails than in psychiatric hospitals (Hails & Borum, 2003). 
 The challenges and problems of criminal-justice functionaries interacting with the 
mentally ill are often experienced by law enforcement, as first responders, on patrol.  
LaGrange (2000) found that, on average, 89% of officers come into contact with 
individuals who are mentally disordered.  Of all police calls, 7% to 10% involve suspects 
who are mentally ill (Hails & Borum, 2003).  Unfortunately, officer training with 
individuals who are mentally ill is minimal, with an average 6.5 hours of training devoted 
to impaired individuals.  The term impaired individual includes a wide range of 
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“unpredictable” people, for example, suspects who abuse alcohol and other substances 
and suspects experiencing psychiatric disorders that range from schizophrenia to 
dementia (Kaminski, Digiovanni, & Downs, 2004). 
Officers, on average, receive 40 hours of training, most of which is devoted to de-
escalation techniques in use of force situations.  In a limited number of departments, 
officers are self-selected to be in specialized mental-health units that offer additional 
training.  The facts that these units are only in a small number of departments is 
problematic because research shows that individuals who are mentally ill do not respond 
to normal police techniques in the same way as the general population does.  Research 
also shows that using general techniques causes an escalation in the use of force 
(Morabito et al., 2012).  Borum (2000) found that communication and mediation skills 
were two of the highest predictors of de-escalation.  Police standard training procedures 
include the use of commands and demands.  Suspects who are experiencing mental 
disturbances may not fully appreciate traditional police commands in the same way as 
they would respond to trained de-escalation techniques.  The latter are often gauged to a 
specific situation and individual.  Many studies show that police encounters with 
impaired persons are more likely to involve the use of force than are encounters with 
unimpaired persons (Crawford & Burns, 1998; Engel, Sobol, & Worden, 2000; Friedrich, 
1980). 
Lack of knowledge of mental illness is often cited as a reason officers respond 
with unreasonable force (Watson, Morabito, Draine, & Ottati, 2008).  Therefore, 
educating officers on mental illness has proven to be more effective than the status quo in 
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reducing force in police interactions with the mentally ill (Watson et al., 2008).  Research 
indicates that the use of force should follow a use-of-force continuum, in which the 
officer’s force is proportional with the suspect’s resistance (Dror, 2007).   This 
continuum is first used in police-academy training to guide novice first responders with a 
conceptually clear way of thinking about the level of force that is reasonably related to 
the suspect’s resistance.  Later, once on the police force, officers think of the kind of 
force that would be reasonably deployed in relation to the resistance they face from 
suspects—the very essence of the linear force continuum that was part of their academy 
training. 
 The first level of the force continuum is law enforcement’s presence.  The 
presence of a police officer is expected to deter crime or de-escalate a potentially violent 
or hostile situation.  Once on the scene, without any indication of suspect resistance, 
police officers are instructed to use nonthreatening verbal commands.  Police may 
increase the volume of their voice and issue short-worded commands (e.g., stop, do not 
move).  When verbal commands are insufficient, empty-hand controls may be indicated.   
These controls include soft techniques (e.g., grabbing or holding a suspect) or hard 
techniques (e.g., punching or kicking a suspect).  Next, nonlethal or less lethal methods 
are available (e.g., blunt impact, chemical sprays, and conduct energy devices).  Finally, 
police are authorized to use lethal or deadly force when the suspect poses an imminent 
threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or someone else (Atherley & Hickman, 
2014). 
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The escalation through different levels of resistance and responses to resistance is 
generally conceived of as linear.  Research on this continuum is quite limited, however, 
and police-suspect interactions are very fluid and, at times, fast paced.  Depending on the 
factual circumstances, the movement from verbal commands to lethal force may occur in 
seconds.  More frequently, police are able to use their presence to diffuse potentially 
violent interactions.  For interactions with suspects, police generally assume a somewhat 
linear progression—one that is also predictably responsive and rational (Burrows, 2007). 
Purpose of the Study 
  Empirical research examining the relationship between police use of force and 
mental illness is lacking (Johnson, 2011).  With an increasing number of interactions 
between police and suspects who are mentally ill and the tendency of such suspects to use 
extreme resistance, research on the reasonableness of the use of force with suspects who 
are mentally ill is critically important (Mulvey & White, 2014).  This dissertation 
explores the reasonableness of law enforcement departures from the force continuum 
with suspects who are mentally ill.  Specifically, the primary research question is: Do law 
enforcement officers, when faced with a suspect who is mentally ill and acting 
irrationally, alter their prescribed progression up the force continuum in ways that 
account for or accommodate the suspect’s perceived unpredictability?   
A secondary research question is as follows: Do law enforcement officers 
experience a higher degree of negative affect when interacting with suspects who are 
mentally ill versus suspects who are not mentally ill? Last, this dissertation examines 
other factors that may be related to the independent or dependent variables.  The hope is 
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that this research will offer insights to police departments with and without use-of-force 
training programs.  Equally important, this kind of research raises awareness of the 
challenges of responding to an ever-increasing number of persons who are mentally ill in 
the criminal-justice system. 
Literature Review 
Law enforcement and use of force. 
 Law enforcement officers have many duties, one of which is being the first to 
respond to scenes of crimes or suspected crimes.  The challenge of being a “first 
responder” includes encounters involving citizens and suspects who are mentally ill 
(Teller, Munetz, Gil, & Ritter, 2014).  These encounters may be difficult and dangerous 
for law enforcement, as police-civilian and police-suspect interactions often engender 
risks.  Suspects who are mentally ill pose additional risks because they may behave 
irrationally, thereby making a determination of the amount of force that is required more 
difficult for officers.  In such situations, police may respond with reasonable force in 
reacting to perceived resistance, or they may respond by under- or overreacting (Police 
Executive Research Forum [PERF], 2012).  Police use-of-force decisions may be a 
function of their awareness of mental illness, present mood, sense of empathy, or possibly 
legal and psychological training as to how to engage individuals who are mentally 
disturbed.  All may be causal or mediating variables that account for variance in use-of-
force decision making by police (Borum, 2000). 
 To the lay public, individuals who experience and display signs of severe mental 
illness are often assumed to be dangerous, violent, unpredictable, untrustworthy, and 
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untruthful (Watson, Corrigan, & Ottati, 2004).  Such assumptions about the expression of 
mental illness certainly vary in accuracy.  These assumptions, however, not only are 
shared by law enforcement but, at times, also frame their interactions with suspects and 
victims who are mentally ill.  The stigma associated with mental illness may at times 
cause police to make false attributions about a suspect’s apparent resistance.  In this way, 
mental illness may confound officers’ decisions about their choice of responses.  
Unfortunately, researchers have yet to examine how these attributions about individuals 
with mental illness influence officers’ reactions (Watson et al., 2004).  This dissertation 
takes small steps to explore how law enforcement officers perceive suspects who are 
mentally ill and how their perceptions affect use-of-force decisions. 
 Some notable research exists on the role of race and class on police officers’ 
decision making (Adler, Mueller, & Laufer, 2016).  Notable cases in the media over the 
past decade highlight lay perceptions that police stop-and-frisk policies and use-of-force 
practices are, in fact, race based.  Research offers some support for these perceptions 
(Plant & Peruche, 2005).  Literature is emerging on the nature and characteristics of 
police officer responses to suspects who are mentally ill.  Watson et al. (2004), for 
example, described a paradigmatic response to exaggerated levels of suspect demands 
and reasonable compliance techniques.  The authors concluded the following:  
Fear of personal injury and a lack of understanding and empathy on the part of the 
police officers, combined with the difficulty or reluctance to comply with 
instructions on the part of the person with mental illness, are the leading causes of 
violent confrontations between the two.  (Watson et al., 2004, p. 379)   
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 A confluence of situational and perceptual factors, according to Watson et al. 
(2004), raises the risk of increasing levels of force.  A priori knowledge that a suspect has 
mental illness may frame an officer’s response when first on the scene of a crime.  
Watson et al. (2004) conducted a vignette study with a sample of police officers.  Each 
vignette provided a scene in which the suspects exhibited varying degrees of mental 
illness.  A control group responded to suspects with no mental illness.  When subjects 
responded to a vignette with a suspect with schizophrenia, for example, they were 
concerned with control along with feeling empathy, both of which were confounded by 
an increased perception of dangerousness.  Other research has demonstrated that officers 
do, indeed, perceive individuals with mental illness as dangerous and that the level of 
perceived dangerousness is associated with officer characteristics.  For example, Bolton 
(2000) found that younger undertrained white officers viewed mental illness in suspects 
as more dangerous in contrast to older minority officers with training in mental illness. 
 Kaminski et al. (2004) found that police interactions with impaired suspects, 
including those with mental illness, are more likely to involve the use of force as 
compared to interactions with non-impaired suspects.  This likelihood is the result, in 
part, of the belief that suspects who are mentally ill fail to decrease their levels of 
resistance when presented with traditional police use-of-force techniques and commands.  
One of many explanations offered for different use-of-force decisions with persons who 
are mentally ill includes “negative” attitudes, more generally, toward persons with mental 
illness.  Lack of education and exposure to persons with mental illness are often 
discussed in relation to use-of-force decisions (Borum, 2000). 
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 The complexity of police officers’ perceptions was considered by Morabito et al. 
(2012).  These researchers concluded that “although people with mental illness are 
usually not dangerous, they can behave bizarrely and may not respond to police officer 
cues in a predictable manner based on the behavior of others” (Morabito et al., 2012, p. 
58).  If this bizarre behavior comes from a highly irrational state of mind, the potential for 
harm to all parties increases (Kaminski et al., 2004).  The unpredictability of the situation 
causes officers to be apprehensive and more likely to respond with force.  Police officers 
often mistake the unpredictable behavior as hostile and purposeful resistance (Cordner, 
2006) when, in fact, it is literally a lack of ability to comprehend and respond to the 
officer’s requests. 
 Johnson (2011) explored whether suspects with mental disorders were more likely 
than non-disordered suspects to prompt physical force from the police.  The findings 
revealed that suspects who were mentally disordered were significantly more likely than 
other suspects to act violently, resist the police, and possess a weapon.  Once these 
characteristics were controlled for, however, suspects who were mentally disordered were 
not any more likely than suspects who were not mentally disordered to receive physical 
force. 
 As Watson et al. (2004) recognized, multiple points of contact are possible 
between police and persons with mental illnesses.  In their vignette study of police 
reactions to a  suspect with schizophrenia, they explored the differential police response 
to (a) a person in need of assistance, (b) a victim, (c) a witness, and (d) a suspect.  This 
chapter reviews police-suspect interactions, while recognizing the importance of such 
			USE	OF	FORCE	 																																																																																																																															9	
interactions.  Special attention is given to the laws, guidelines, and standards governing 
police use of force and how some police departments have developed specialized units 
and programs to ensure a measured response to suspects who are mentally ill.  This 
review is followed by a consideration of the role of stigma in fashioning police responses 
to suspects who are mentally ill.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
prominent psychological theories that explain some of the variance in how and why 
police attribute dangerousness to the mentally ill population. 
Legal constraints on law enforcement. 
At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton 
Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to answer a “prowler inside call.” 
Upon arriving at the scene they saw a woman standing on her porch and 
gesturing toward the adjacent house.  She told them she had heard glass 
breaking and that “they” or “someone” was breaking in next door.  While 
Wright radioed the dispatcher to say that they were on the scene, Hymon 
went behind the house.  He heard a door slam and saw someone run across 
the backyard.  The fleeing suspect, who was appellee-respondent’s decedent, 
Edward Garner, stopped at a 6-feet-high chain link fence at the edge of the 
yard.  With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon was able to see Garner’s face and 
hands.  He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was “reasonably 
sure” and “figured” that Garner was unarmed.  He thought Garner was 17 or 
18 years old and about 5’5” or 5’7” tall.  While Garner was crouched at the 
base of the fence, Hymon called out “police, halt” and took a few steps 
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toward him.  Garner then began to climb over the fence.  Convinced that if 
Garner made it over the fence he would elude capture, Hymon shot him.  The 
bullet hit Garner in the back of the head.  Garner was taken by ambulance to 
a hospital, where he died on the operating table.  Ten dollars and a purse 
taken from the house were found on his body (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1,4, 1985). 
 In the police academy, all cadets hear about the life and death of Edward Garner, 
a young, unarmed, fleeing suspect.  The United States Supreme Court case that bears his 
name, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), remains the law today and has been 
interpreted literally thousands of times by federal and state courts.  The law may be 
simply stated: It is unconstitutional, a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
on unreasonable seizures, for police to use deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect 
who is unarmed.  Of course, when police have probable cause to believe that there is a 
threat of serious physical harm to officers or others, the use of deadly force is justified 
(e.g., when the suspect threatens police or a civilian with a weapon).  This outer boundary 
on the permissible use of force by police is deeply embedded in all police-training 
programs, in all state laws, and in all police department policies regarding the 
“reasonable use of force” (Tennenbaum, 1994). 
 The case of Tennessee v. Garner (1985) offers no more than the constitutional 
boundary for what police may or may not do.  The prevailing standard for whether 
excessive force can be used comes from a case that was decided 4 years later (Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 1989).  In Graham v. Connor (1989), the Court explained that 
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there must be a balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake” 
(490 U.S., at 396).  Thus, the Court ruled that determining, after the fact, whether 
reasonable force was used by police comes from an objective reasonableness standard: 
whether police officers behaved in an objectively reasonable way in light of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. 
 In the aftermath of Garner and Graham, countless cases alleging excessive force 
were brought against police departments, municipalities, states, and the federal 
government.  Each case brings a challenge to the balancing test articulated in Graham v. 
Connor (1989) or with an allegation of an unreasonable use of deadly force, a challenge 
to Tennessee v. Garner (1985).  In recent years, an increasing number of cases have 
raised questions about the constitutionality of force used against suspects who are 
mentally ill.  Consider, for example, the case of Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 
1036 (6th Cir. 1992), in which a recently discharged patient with mental illness was shot 
by a Taser four times and shot with bullets 22 times by police.  National news 
organizations fail to cover cases like James Boyd, who was shot by the Albuquerque 
Police Department in 2014 after irrationally pleading with officers that he not receive 
another directive from the Department of Defense.  Each year, an increasing number of 
cases of the killing of suspects with mental illness seem to become news stories that 
never make it out of local news stations to national networks (e.g., CBS, NBC, and ABC) 
or cable news programs. 
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 The challenge of determining the objective reasonableness of police officers’ use 
of force with rational suspects is daunting.  Making those determinations with the 
additional complexity of a suspect population with mental illness is extraordinarily 
difficult.   One report on the problem of offenders with mental illness concluded the 
following:  
Persons with mental illness, drug and alcohol addictions, or disorders such as 
autism can present police officers with difficult challenges.  In some cases, a 
person may brandish a weapon or otherwise appear to pose a threat to the public, 
to the police, or to himself or herself.  The threat may be a real one, or the 
situation may be less dangerous than it appears, and often it is difficult to assess 
the level of danger.  These situations often are complicated when, because of their 
conditions, persons cannot communicate effectively with police officers.  In some 
cases, they may appear to be threatening or uncooperative, when in fact they are 
unable to understand an officer’s questions or orders.  (PERF, 2012)  
 Police departments have more than milestone cases in constitutional law, state 
laws, and departmental directives to help in their determinations.  A long-standing metric 
for determining the objective reasonableness of use-of-force decisions by police is 
captured by a theoretical continuum—the use-of-force continuum (Terrill & Paoline, 
2012). 
The use-of-force continuum. 
 The use-of-force continuum guides the response of officers to escalating police-
suspect encounters (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995).   The International 
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Association of Chiefs of Police defines force as the “amount of effort required by police 
to compel compliance by an unwilling subject” (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 2009, 
p. 1).  The use-of-force continuum is a practical guide designed to help officers determine 
the optimal level of force to use in relation to the suspect’s resistance (Aveni, 2003; 
Wolf, Mesloh, Henych, & Thompson, 2009).  The continuum was derived when police 
use of force clearly could not logically be conceptualized in dichotomous terms (i.e., 
either force or no force; Garner et al., 1995).  Police have a singular objective: to gain 
control of the situation.  The concept of a use-of-force continuum moves officers through 
a distinct and increasing series of steps, akin to ascending or descending a ladder, ranging 
from the least amount of force, such as verbal commands, to deadly force (Aveni, 2003; 
Terrill, 2005). 
 The use-of-force continuum begins when an officer arrives on scene.  The 
presence of the officer is supposed to impose order and, at the same time, halt and deter 
any disruptive or criminal behavior.  The presence of the responding officer imparts a 
combination of legitimacy and power, while being both controlling and commanding 
(NIJ, 2009).  The second level of force entails a series of available verbal commands.  
This stage of the use-of-force continuum comprises its own range of officer responses.  
The first is a calm command.  If the suspect does not listen, then the officer increases the 
volume of the command and uses terse language for compliance (Clede & Parsons, 
1987).  The third and fourth stages of the use-of-force continuum are often thought of as 
the intermediate level of force.  In the third stage, an officer may use his or her body to 
reclaim control of the situation by engaging in empty-hand control, consisting of soft and 
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hard techniques (NIJ, 2009).  Soft techniques are when an officer uses hands to grab, 
hold, or restrain a suspect.  Hard techniques are when officers need to use more 
substantial physical force to match the suspect’s resistance.  This resistance may entail 
either striking or kicking the suspect.  The fourth stage is when an officer uses a weapon 
other than a gun to regain control.  These weapons include batons, Tasers, and chemical 
sprays (Aveni, 2003; Lumb & Friday, 1997).  The goal of this stage is to immobilize the 
suspect.  The fifth and final stage entails lethal force, as when officers discharge their 
guns.  Lethal force may take place at any stage of the use-of-force continuum, except in 
the first two stages (Garner et al., 1995; NIJ, 2009).  The use of a gun is considered the 
most lethal, even though, quite remarkably, death occurs in only one-fifth of police 
shootings (Clede & Parsons, 1987; see Appendix A). 
 Over the past 20 years, the use-of-force continuum has assumed different forms.  
Aveni (2003) carefully distinguished these forms, ranging from linear designs, modified 
linear continuums, and nonlinear designs to perceptual continuums.  These changes, 
according to Aveni, are an attempt to represent the dynamic nature of police-suspect 
interactions and to shift from a theoretical orientation to a more practical, real-life view.  
The linear designs are much like the ladder analogy offered previously: Each rung is an 
increasing sequence for escalation.  The rungs are heuristics for officers when assessing 
the level of resistance that they must apply (Terrill, 2005). 
The modified linear continuums are akin to a tree that branches off into different 
responses (see Appendix B).   An example of a modified linear continuum is the 1997 FBI 
suggested use-of-force model (Aveni, 2003).  This model starts with the first rung, officer 
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presence, and increases to verbal commands.  The next step is where the model departs 
from the traditional use-of-force continuum; instead of giving a command or a force 
escalation, it gives the response of the suspect on two different branches, for example, if 
he or she is compliant to the request by the officer or not (Borum, 2000).  If the suspect is 
compliant, the escalation ceases and a resolution is found; if the suspect is noncompliant, 
the model continuum provides resistance-appropriate scenarios for the officer to engage 
in relative to the suspect’s resistance (Aveni, 2003).  This model was designed to allow 
officers to see the use-of-force continuum as adaptive to each unique situation (see 
Appendix C). 
Nonlinear designs were created to represent the police officer’s everyday 
encounters, which are anything but linear.  Some law enforcement agencies, like Ontario, 
Canada’s law enforcement agency, decided to use this model for multiple reasons.  The 
first reason is that this use-of-force continuum, which often takes the form of a wheel, 
allows officers to immediately match the suspect’s resistance with a commensurate use of 
force.  Second, this model accounts for the wide variety of threats that the officer might 
encounter that extends far past the traditional model.  Last, and possibly the most 
important, research shows that this technique reduces deadly force (Aveni, 2003) by 
allowing officers to extricate themselves from a situation by disengagement or de-
escalation.  Although all use-of-force continuums account for some form of de-
escalation, this model is the only one that incorporates it into the actual continuum.  An 
officer can quickly draw on these continuums in an encounter instead of having to recall 
detailed department policies and protocols.  As a result, an officer can quickly escalate or 
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de-escalate force levels. 
 The last model, and one that is often used for training officers or investigating 
use-of-force situations after the fact, is the perceptual continuum.  The model starts with 
officers’ expectations about the situation upon arrival and continues to the point when the 
officers make their first point of contact with the suspect.  The model then branches off 
into three different factors: (a) possible threat perception, (b) key event, and (c) actual 
threat perception.  Each situation is analyzed and evaluated, and then a plan is formulated 
to react.  The reactions, similar to the theory of Cannon (1927) and expounded on by 
Barlow (2002), include fight, flight, or freeze.  The last branch is the aftermath of the 
situation.  This continuum allows for investigators and internal affairs to assess whether 
the officer was justified in his or her response to the suspect. 
 The importance of these use-of-force continuum models is simple: to provide 
officers with intuitive guidelines that structure what must, at times, be reflective reactions 
to perceived and actual resistance.  The reaction of some academics to these use-of-force 
continuums is mixed.  Garner et al. (1995), for example, reported that use-of-force 
continuums are based on little, if any, empirical support and are not designed in ways that 
allow for systematic measurement or operationalization.  Instead, these use-of-force 
continuums are modified and tailored to each police department’s needs and policies.  
Some police use these use-of-force continuums to make internal policy and legal 
requirements more formal. 
 For other departments, the use-of-force continuum functions as a heuristic for 
police in situations during which response time is critical.  Dror, Basola, and Busemeyer 
			USE	OF	FORCE	 																																																																																																																															17	
(1999) found that officers are more conservative in their use of force when in situations 
that are considered low risk.  The opposite occurs when officers are in high-risk 
situations, during which police tend toward more risk taking.  Dror et al. (1999) 
concluded that these different behaviors are the result of a lack of cognitive capacity in 
relation to the high-risk situation.  They elaborate that officers are often using heuristics 
in order to assess the scene, thus creating a need for a use-of-force continuum that 
consists of small, succinct categories that allow for a measured construction of the force 
necessary to respond to a suspect’s resistance.  Garner et al. (1995) described the use-of -
force continuum as establishing “legal and policy requirements that officers use no more 
force than is reasonably necessary to obtain compliance” (p. 151). 
 In this dissertation, the selection of a linear use-of-force continuum reflects (a) the 
policy in place at the police department surveyed, (b) the most representative continuum 
used by large municipal police departments, and (c) the best proxy for a rational and 
justifiable escalation of police use of force in relation to suspect resistance. 
These assumptions about compliance must not be violated if the use-of-force 
continuum is going to allow for a linear increase or decrease in police use of force.  These 
assumptions also include two rational actors—police officers and suspects—who make 
choices for increasing and decreasing force and resistance in ways that are reasonably 
predictable (i.e., more force by police will prompt less resistance all the way up the use-
of-force continuum to deadly force).  This two-dimensional use-of-force continuum does 
not, however, accommodate irrational reactions, such as efforts to engage in deadly 
resistance in response to minimal force, verbal commands, or mere presence at the scene.   
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Suspects who are mentally ill, therefore, may introduce a confound to the inherent logic 
of the continuum. 
Mental illness and law enforcement. 
Estimates vary widely as to the number of police-civilian interactions that involve 
suspects who are mentally ill and the resulting number of arrests (Johnson, 2011; 
Kaminski et al., 2004).  A wide range of studies across many jurisdictions finds 
significant contact between police and suspects who are mentally ill.  For example, 
LaGrange (2000) concluded that nearly 90% of all officers come into contact with 
suspects who are mentally ill.  Hails and Borum (2003) estimated that 10% of all police 
calls involve suspects who are mentally ill.  Further, Engel and Silver (2001) reported 
that suspects who are mentally disordered were significantly more likely to be arrested 
than those who are not mentally ill (47.5% vs. 27.9%, respectively). 
 Police departments often have explicit policies that explain how officers might 
have to rethink the rationality of the use-of-force continuum in situations when a suspect 
displays signs or symptoms of psychological and psychiatric distress.  Policies tend to 
cover three distinct sets of rules.  First, officers must be able to recognize the kind of 
behavior that is associated with a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis, particularly 
those behaviors indicative of dangers to self and others.  Officers are often asked to look 
for recognizable signs and symptoms of mental illness, including but not limited to 
exaggerated reactions based on apparent fear or anger, inappropriate and unprovoked 
behaviors, frustrations, delusions, and paranoia (Albuquerque Police Department, 2013; 
Lamb, Weinberger, & DeCuir, 2002; Reuland, 2004). 
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 Second, in combination with rules for recognizing abnormal behavior, officers are 
asked to do their best to determine the degree of present danger and not to assume that 
mental illness is inherently dangerous.  Officers need to look for specific indications of 
dangerousness, from the access to weapons and direct threats of violence or aggression to 
known history of violence or aggression (Albuquerque Police Department, 2013; Lamb et 
al., 2002; Reuland, 2004). 
 Finally, rules of engagement for handling suspects who are mentally ill often 
require additional officers on the scene, including officers with specialized training or 
supervisors.  Officers are asked to move down the use-of-force continuum, if possible, to 
de-escalate a suspect’s resistance.  Successful de-escalation is accomplished, at least in 
part, by establishing good communication with the suspect (Albuquerque Police 
Department, 2013; Lamb et al., 2002; Reuland, 2004). 
 Beyond articulating specific policies for suspects who are mentally ill, police 
departments are also increasingly providing their officers with general information about 
mental illness and programs for police interactions with citizens who are mentally ill 
(Hails & Borum, 2003).  These programs are described in the following section. 
Specialized law enforcement programs. 
Three types of specialized program models exist to help police respond to calls 
involving people who are mentally ill.  These models include (a) specialized police 
response programs designed by police, (b) police-based specialized mental-health 
response programs, and (c) mental-health-based specialized mental-health response 
programs (Hails & Borum, 2003).  The first model is an in-house-based program with 
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law enforcement officers serving as the initial mental-health crisis intervention team.  
After stabilizing the scene, officers are asked to act as a liaison to an established mental-
health center in the community.  An example is the crisis intervention team (CIT) model 
that originated in Memphis, Tennessee.  The focus of CIT training is on training the 
officers to identify individuals suffering from mental illness and increase their level of 
confidence in responding.  This model is associated with many favorable anecdotal 
outcomes.  It is also regularly modified to accommodate the demographics of the 
population that is using it, for example, urban or rural settings and size of police force 
(Watson et al., 2008). 
 The second program type, police-based specialized mental-health response 
programs, is currently being used in 13% of police forces in the United States (Hails & 
Borum, 2003).  Some police departments refer to this program as mobile crisis units.   
Such programs involve mental-health professionals who are employed by the police 
department.  These mental-health professionals, however, do not share the training and 
status of police officers.  Most have no police training.  Their purpose is to provide on-
site and in-field consultation to law enforcement (Hails & Borum, 2003). 
 The third type is a mental-health-based specialized mental-health response 
program, often referred to as mobile mental-health crisis teams (MCTs).  This model is 
considered by some to be the most conventional, even though it is the least common type 
of program (Aveni, 2003).  Currently, only 8% of police departments employ this model, 
although nearly 30% once used it.  This model involves creating partnerships across 
community mental-health organizations (Hails & Borum, 2003).  It relies heavily on the 
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interactions between local mental-health clinics and police departments, which often 
engender complications.  Research indicates that some of those complications are related 
to the unfavorable view law enforcement holds of mental-health professionals (Borum, 
2000). 
 The availability of specific policies and different program types suggests the 
challenge facing municipal police departments.  In particular, mental-health-care 
institutions increasingly discharge patients who present compliance, health care, and 
behavioral risks.  These risks are revealed by the number of mentally ill persons whose 
custody and care have migrated into the criminal-justice system (Markowitz, 2011). 
Mental illness and stigma. 
 Mental illness is an epidemic in the United States.  Millions of individuals are 
suffering from different forms of mental illness.  Data from the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, 2015) indicate mental illness is 
relatively stable in the United States population.  Between 2008 and 2014, the number of 
adult individuals with mental illness in the United States fluctuated approximately 1%.  
Funding for mental-health services was projected to rise an estimated $170 billion from 
2003 until 2014 (Levit et al., 2008).  A Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 2015) report 
from 2010 found that 63.3 million visits were made to physicians’ offices, emergency 
rooms, and outpatient departments specifically related to mental disorders.  The National 
Institute of Mental Health (Insel, 2011) reported that mental disorders were more 
expensive than the combined costs of treatment for malignant tumors, Type 1 and Type 2 
diabetes, and respiratory disorders.  The number of individuals suffering from mental 
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illness is just as staggering.  The National Alliance on Mental Health (NAMH, 2015) 
reported that 43.8 million Americans, or one in five adults, suffer from some form of 
mental illness.  Mental illness ranges from mildly distressing to extremely consuming and 
debilitating.  Severe mental illness, as defined by SAMHSA (2015), is when an 
individual is suffering from a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder that significantly 
interferes with one or more of his or her life activities.  Ten million Americans met this 
criterion, with 2.4 million Americans suffering from schizophrenia and 6.1 million 
Americans suffering from bipolar disorder (NAMH, 2015).  Research from NAMH 
(2013) revealed that only a small percentage of those who are mentally ill are receiving 
treatment. 
 Such laws as the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 reduced the 
resources available for those with mental illness.  This legislation, and other federal, 
state, and local laws, made receiving treatment all the more difficult.  Prior to the 1960s, 
large numbers of people who were mentally ill were treated in publicly funded mental-
health hospitals (Borum, 2000).  When funding was significantly reduced, however, 
many of the patients living in these facilities had no other mental-health options.  This 
trend is evidenced by a decreasing number of available mental-health beds.  In 1960, 
approximately 314 beds were available per 100,000 people (Markowitz, 2011).  By 1990, 
after a majority of the mental-health funding had been cut, approximately 40 beds were 




 The defunding of mental-health hospitals, also known as deinstitutionalization, 
left many of those who resided in the hospitals without stable plans as to how to 
transition to life outside of structured care (Borum, 2000).  One-third of individuals who 
met criteria for a mental illness were reported as homeless.  Currently, 26% of adults with 
mental illness reside in a homeless shelter (NAMI, 2015).  Markowtiz (2011) wrote that 
criminogenic environments are marked by mental illness and homelessness.  These 
environments explain, in part, the concerning rise in individuals with mental illness who 
are residing in the criminal-justice system. 
 Remarkably, the criminal-justice system has taken in a significant portion of the 
mentally ill population.  Watson et al. (2008) went so far as to refer to police officers as 
gatekeepers to both the mental-health and criminal-justice systems, elaborating that “the 
large numbers of people with mental illness in jails and prisons has fueled policy concern 
in all domains of the justice system” (p. 1).  Of course, prisons and jails have assumed the 
role of mental health hospitals in the past.  In the early 19th century, jails and prisons were 
the repositories of persons with mental illness.  Eventually, in a time of widespread 
change and mental-health reform, Americans regarded the institutionalization of persons 
with mental illness in prison as inhumane.  This change in public sentiment led to the 
increased use of the now largely defunct mental hospitals (Torrey, Kennard, Eslinger, 
Lamb, & Pavle, 2010). 
 The number of inmates who are severely mentally ill is now rising at an alarming 
pace.  Torrey et al. (2010) found that only 6.4% of inmates in the early 1980s were 
mentally ill.  Research conducted in 2010 found that the number of incarcerated 
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individuals with mental illness had nearly tripled.  In 2010, nearly one-fifth of 
incarcerated individuals in the United States suffered from mental illness.  Kim, Becker-
Cohen, and Serakos (2015) reported even more alarming numbers, finding that more than 
half of state prisoners and local jail inmates had mental-health problems.  Approximately 
45% of all federal prisoners experience these problems as well.  Perhaps most disturbing 
is the fact that 70% of youths in the juvenile justice system have been diagnosed with 
mental illness, and of those, 20% suffer from a severe mental illness (SAMHSA, 2015).  
The space that these individuals consume is not the only problem created by this shift in 
the criminal-justice system caring for persons who are mentally ill.  Research by Goss, 
Peterson, Smith, Kalb, and Brodey	(2002) found three of four attempted suicides were 
made by inmates with diagnosable mental illness. 
 The mental-health stigma in the criminal-justice system is far from surprising 
when one realizes the challenges of serving the care, custody, and control needs of 
persons who are mentally ill, often with limited space and resources.  This stigma is 
likely to impact the actions of all criminal-justice functionaries (e.g., use of force by 
police, competency decisions by courts, and classification of inmates by risk level in 
correctional institutions).  This stigma may have far-reaching effects, including 
discrimination, limited opportunities, inadequate access to health care, and 
marginalization in society. 
Mental-health stigma and differential treatment. 
 Historically, persons who are mentally ill have experienced discrimination and 
stigmatization across a wide range of settings (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008).  The collective 
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concern about both discrimination and stigmatization was so great in 1999 that the United 
States Surgeon General recognized mental-health stigma as a barrier to opportunities and 
treatment for those with mental illness (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 
2003).  The report found that the stigma of mental illness had longstanding iterative, 
tautological effects, from the initial stigma to poor treatment, followed by feelings of 
demoralization, low self-esteem, and internalization of the stigma, to the reinforcement of 
those feelings by external stigma.  The practical impact of this reinforcing circular 
stigmatization includes challenges in obtaining housing and employment and far less than 
fair and just interactions with law enforcement (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008). 
 Perceptions of mental illness, its meaning and effects, are constantly evolving.  In 
the early 1950s, the public’s awareness of mental illness was minimal (Markowitz, 2011).  
Survey research at the time revealed that most Americans associated mental illness with a 
generic, lay conception of psychosis, revealing a very narrow conception of 
psychopathology.  Four and a half decades later, the same survey was conducted again 
(Markowitz, 2011).  This time, respondents revealed a more informed and progressive 
view of mental illness, with only 35% believing that mental illness is simply a psychosis.  
Respondents also noted that depression, anxiety, substance use, and more persistent life-
long disorders, such as personality disorders, were types of mental illness (Markowitz, 
2011).  A study conducted in the late 1990s by Markowitz (2011) gave subjects vignettes 
of individuals with three types of illness: depression, schizophrenia, and substance abuse.  
Of the sample, 88% correctly identified schizophrenia and 96% correctly diagnosed 
depression.  When asked if subjects believed that these illnesses were caused by external 
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factors, most of the sample believed that the illnesses were outside of one’s control and 
did not reflect poorly on one’s character. 
 Many studies show a significant increase in the awareness of mental health and 
mental-health diseases.  This rising awareness, though, is contemporaneous with beliefs 
that mental illness is highly correlated with violence, unpredictability, and 
dangerousness.  According to Martin, Pescosolido, and Tuch (2000), attitudes and 
conceptions of mental illness are changing.  Martin et al. observed that the number of 
respondents who connect mental illness with violence has nearly doubled in the past 50 
years.  They wrote that those who equate mental illness with psychosis tend to attribute 
dangerousness to the mentally ill and generally reject them in every aspect of life.  The 
intuition that the increases in the association between violence and dangerousness in 
persons who are mentally ill are tied to media and fictional portrayals of mental illness is 
fair and worthy of empirical exploration.  
Criminalization hypothesis. 
 The perception of individuals who are mentally ill as criminals is referred to as 
the criminalization hypothesis.  Engel and Silver (2001) assumed the position that some 
police attribute a quasi-criminal or criminal label to persons with mental illness.  
According to Engel and Silver), evidence in support of this hypothesis may be divided 
into three parts.  First, a disproportionate number of persons who are mentally ill are in 
each and every stage of the criminal-justice system.  Second, the very specific number of 
former mental-health arrestees reflects this hypothesis.  Third, the arrest rates of suspects 
who are mentally disordered far exceed the rates for those who are not mentally 
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disordered.  A growing but contested stream of research reveals that suspects with signs 
of mental illness are much more likely than those without such signs to be arrested.  A 
less contentious but growing body of work grounds intuitions and hypotheses about 
suspects with mental illness and their treatment in leading psychological theories. 
Theories. 
 Social cognitive model. 
A significant percentage of police work involves contact with individuals who are 
suffering from a serious mental illness in the role of suspect, victim, or witness.  The 
erratic behavior of an individual who is severely mentally ill can be unpredictable, 
prompting a deviation from the formal training of a criminal-justice functionary.  Often, 
police officers must use a heuristic to predict a suspect’s next response.  Officers 
frequently engage in behavior consistent with attribution theory.  This theory is closely 
associated with the social cognitive model.  This intuitive model simply proposes that 
individuals learn by observing others and that their perspective is taken from their own 
social sphere and world view.  Corrigan (2000) offered an analogy of a social cognitive 
model for individuals with mental illness, concluding “persons with severe mental illness 
signal the public about their mental illness.  These signals yield stereotypes about persons 
with mental illness.  Stereotypes lead to behavioral reactions or discrimination” (p. 49).  
An example of a signal is a person talking to him or herself.  That signal would produce a 
stereotype of “crazy people are erratic.” This stereotype might produce a behavioral 
response that could manifest in people avoiding individuals who are mentally ill.  This 
response would likely result in one or more forms of discrimination. 
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Attribution theory. 
 Attribution theory is used to describe the thought processes behind police 
interactions with civilians, particularly those with mental illness.  Fritz Heider’s 1958 
attribution theory is a widely influential theory that explains the process of understanding 
the behavior of others (Weiner, 2008).  Corrigan (2000) conceived of attribution theory 
as “fundamentally a model of human motivation and emotion based on the assumption 
that individuals search for causal understanding of everyday events” (p. 52).  This theory, 
although not currently a dominant paradigm, has been subjected to active hypothesis 
testing over the course of the past nearly 60 years.  Many researchers believe that healthy 
and adaptive behavior is characterized by attributions.  The critical piece of the theory is 
that it assesses for perceptions or what some describe as achievement outcomes (Weiner, 
2008).  Malle (2004) described reasons, or ascriptions, as commonplace justifications for 
ordinary behavior.  However, attributions, or outcomes, are conceived to be less common 
in straightforward psychology.  Attribution theory is focused solely on causes. 
 Attribution theory captures the idea of agency and what is referred to in the 
literature as locus of control.  Heider first spoke about this concept in his seminal 1958 
book as loci, which translates to can.  He believed that ability, loci, was centered on the 
individual’s internal state, while task difficulty was more attributable to external factors 
and influences.  Rotter (1954) conceptualized locus of control and used the more 
common terminology of internal and external locus of control.  Rotter wrote that the idea 
of locus of control reflects individuals’ perceptions of an event and their belief in the 
level of their control.  Ability was referred to as internal locus of control, meaning that 
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individuals perceive that they have agency over an event, situation, or life circumstance.  
Task difficulty was slightly changed, resulting in the name external locus of control, 
meaning that individuals perceive that they have little to no control over the events in 
their lives and that fate, environment, or chance dictates the outcome of their life 
circumstances. 
 Rotter’s theory is used in police use-of-force literature and the study of suspects 
who are mentally ill.  Corrigan (2000) reported that “research has found significant 
associations for controllability attributions about mental illness and two emotional 
reactions: anger and pity” (p. 55).  Watson et al. (2004) reported the following:  
According to attribution theory, persons who are viewed as responsible for 
negative situations (e.g., not having a way to get home) are more likely to be 
reacted to with anger and punished or denied help.  Conversely, individuals who 
are not believed to be in control of a negative situation are pitied by others and 
helped.  (p. 379)  
Watson et al. (2004) conducted a study using vignettes that were given to police 
officers with the content detailing how the label of mental illness influences attribution, 
affect, and perception.  In this study, police officers attributed less blame to and felt more 
empathy for subjects with schizophrenia.  At the same time, they considered subjects 
with schizophrenia more dangerous than individuals without severe mental illness.  Ruiz 
(1993) also reported that officers erroneously believed that suspects who are mentally ill 
are more dangerous than their non-mentally-ill counterparts.  Watson et al. (2004) 
reported the following: 
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Fear of personal injury and a lack of understanding and empathy on the part of 
officers, combined with the difficulty or reluctance to comply with instructions on 
the part of the person with mental illness, are the two leading causes of violent 
confrontations between the two.  (p. 379)  
Part of this misconception has been linked to a lack of information about suspects 
who are mentally ill that produces negative attitudes of police toward those suspects 
(Borum, 2000).  Ultimately, a police officer is more likely to have empathy for a suspect 
who is mentally ill when the idea of mental illness is understood, the suspect’s demeanor 
is nonthreatening and nonhostile, and, at the same time, the officer perceives some 
control over his or her presence at the scene of a crime.  All of these factors will likely 
influence the officer’s responses to suspects who are mentally ill.  The first option is to 
simply do nothing, essentially ignoring that the situation has occurred.  The second 
option is to take the suspect into custody.  The third option is to not arrest the suspect 
and, instead, informally resolve the matter.  The last option is to come to some other kind 
of “formal resolution,” such as seeking involuntary commitment if the suspect appears to 
be a danger to him or herself or others.  Law enforcement perceptions, attitudes, and 
situational factors influence decision making. 
Summary 
The criminal-justice system in the United States is known for problems associated 
with race-based decision making (Adler et al., 2016).  Far less is known about how 
individuals with mental illness are perceived and treated by criminal-justice functionaries 
across the entire system—from the initial point of contact (police) to classification 
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decisions in state correctional institutions.  This dissertation explores the reactions of 
police to suspects who are mentally ill versus suspects who are not mentally ill.  More 
specifically, this study determines whether these differences lead officers to stray from 
the force continuum and whether certain factors moderate this effect.  First responders 
must determine whether a criminal wrongdoing has occurred; who is responsible; 
whether the responsible party should be detained, placed in custody, and possibly 
removed from the scene; and the kind of force, if any, that is necessary and justifiable.  
When a suspect suffers from a mental illness, all of these decisions are made more 
difficult.  No single decision is more important or has greater consequences than police 
use of force. 
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Chapter 2.  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
H1: It is hypothesized that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects 
displaying signs of mental illness will use greater force compared to officers exposed to 
vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness. 
Rationale for H1: Law enforcement officers are often in situations where they 
must decide whether to use force against a suspect’s resistance and the amount of force 
that is justified.  Suspects who suffer from overt mental illness make those decisions 
much more difficult.  Kaminski et al. (2004) found that when interacting with impaired 
suspects, either under the influence of a substance or displaying a mental illness, officers 
are more likely to use force as compared to when interacting with nonimpaired suspects.  
Watson et al. (2004) found that law enforcement officers perceive suspects displaying 
signs of mental illness as more hostile and threatening than their non-mentally ill 
counterparts. 
Hypothesis 2 
H2: It is hypothesized that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects 
displaying signs of mental illness will experience a higher degree of negative affect 
compared to officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of 
mental illness. 
 Rationale for H2: Increased force might, in part, be the result of officers 
associating mental illness with a negative connotation (Borum, 2000).  These behaviors 
stem from a widely held belief that police techniques and commands that are commonly 
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used in police-suspect interactions are ineffective with persons who are mentally ill 
(Watson et al., 2008).  These negative and ill-informed behaviors and beliefs result from 
a lack of training on the topic of mental illness (Borum, 2000). 
Exploratory Analyses 
 In addition, exploratory analyses were conducted to examine the association of 
officer characteristics (i.e., age, years of service, empathy, and attitudes toward mental 
illness) with use of force.  These analyses follow up on research indicating that certain 
officer characteristics may influence the way officers perceive suspects who are mentally 
ill.  For example, Watson et al. (2004) reported that officers who had less formal training 
with suspects who were mentally ill and were younger perceived suspects with mental 
illness as much more dangerous and aggressive than their non-mentally ill counterparts. 
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
Overview 
 This dissertation examines the perceived reasonableness of police use of force 
when an officer faces resistance from suspects whose behavior suggests mental illness.  
The central question posed is whether police officers are more likely to deviate from the 
prescribed force continuum when interacting with apparently mentally ill versus 
apparently non-mentally ill suspects.  This dissertation also explores police officers’ 
levels of affect, empathy, and attitudes toward mental illness. 
Design and Design Justification 
 This dissertation is based on archival data from a larger host study on police use 
of force sponsored by a regional police agency with headquarters in a large city in the 
Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.  This study’s design includes a randomized 
between-group repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Participants 
 In the first quarter of 2016, in response to increasing public scrutiny of stop-and-
frisk and police use-of-force decision making, the chief of the police agency initiated a 
series of studies on policing and the Fourth Amendment.  The objective of this research 
program was to proactively examine some of the challenges of an urban police 
department in balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the civil rights and 
liberties of citizens.  This research program included an examination of the level of 
substantive criminal-law knowledge by patrol officers in relation to stop-and-frisk 
decisions, the effect of body cameras on the exercise of police use of force, the role of 
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race and gender in police use-of-force decisions, and how police officers perceive use-of-
force decisions with suspects and citizens who present as mentally ill. This	dissertation	uses	archival	data	from	the	administration	of	a	survey	of	police	officers	regarding	suspects	and	citizens	with	mental	illness	for	this	last	research	project.		Participants	were	140	officers	(N	=	140)	randomly	drawn	from	all	ranks,	from	patrol	officers	to	those	reporting	directly	to	the	chief	of	police. 
 Inclusion criteria for participants from the larger study were sworn officers of any 
rank in this regional police department.  No exclusion criteria were used if the inclusion 
criteria were met. 
Measures: Primary Outcomes 
Vignettes and questions. 
Participants responded to two hypothetical scenarios of criminal acts occurring in 
two different settings, both involving unlawful behavior engaged in by an individual 
displaying either overt signs of mental illness or no signs of mental illness.  Specifically, 
the first vignette involved an individual avoiding the fare on a train and brandishing a 
knife.  The second vignette involved an individual attempting to break in to a cash 
register in a Dunkin Donuts.  Signs of mental illness found in the hypothetical scenarios 
were taken from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; 
DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) sections on Schizophrenia Spectrum 
and Other Psychotic Disorders.  The settings of the scenarios were selected and adapted 
from archival transit police reports involving a “302 Petition” during the 2015 calendar 
year.  A “302 Petition” is an authorization for law enforcement, physicians, or a county 
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mental-health officer who seeks involuntary emergency evaluation of an individual for a 
period of no longer than 5 days.  Scenarios were rated by three senior police officers of 
different ranks for their representativeness and were selected on that basis, i.e., the extent 
to which scenarios were “typical” of police interactions with suspects who are mentally 
ill.  Questions following the factual scenarios asked participants to consider (a) the 
number of verbal warnings or commands that the officer should employ before escalating 
any force response and (b) what the officer’s next response should be if those verbal 
warnings or commands did not work.  These responses were subsequently coded by two 
blind raters, who sorted them into one of five level-of-force categories.  Discrepancies 
were reconciled by an independent third rater.  Raters used the National Institute of 
Justice Force Continuum (NIJ, 2015) as a guide for rating decisions. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), a 20-item mood scale, was administered to all participants.  Ten questions pertain 
to positive affect and 10 questions consider negative affect.  Positive affect (PA) 
descriptors include attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, proud, 
determined, strong, and active.  Negative affect (NA) consists of five categories that each 
contain two terminologies: distressed and upset (distressed category), hostile and irritable 
(angry category), scared and afraid (fearful category), ashamed and guilty (guilty 
category), and nervous and jittery (jittery category).  Participants were asked to rate their 
level of association, in the present moment, with the words presented to them using a 5-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very slight or not at all) to 5 (extremely).  The 
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PANAS asks participants to rate their level of affect, how they feel, during a variety of 
different points in time, including the present moment, today, past few days, past few 
weeks, past year, and, generally.  For the purpose of the present study, participants rated 
the extent to which they felt a particular way in the present moment. 
 Measures of reliability for the different time points using coefficient alpha are 
both consistent and significant, with an alpha of .89 for present-moment PA and .88 for 
past-year PA.  Negative affect results were similar, with past-moment ratings of .85 and 
past-year ratings of .87 (Watson et al., 1988).  The PANAS allows for scoring 
independently for the dichotomous dimensions: positive affect and negative affect.  
Scores for each dimension range from 10 to 50, with low levels of negative affect 
revealed by lower scores and with high levels of positive affect denoted by higher scores.  
Watson et al.’s (1988) initial study on reliability found significant internal consistency in 
a nonclinical sample.  Alphas ranged from .86 to.89 for PA and from .84 to .87 for NA.   
Additionally, a negative correlation was found between PA and NA, showing dimensions 
as orthogonal.  Watson et al. summarized that “the PANAS scales provide reliable, 
precise, and largely independent measures of Positive Affect and Negative Affect, 
regardless of the subject population studied or the time frame and response format used” 
(p. 1067). 
Measures: Correlations 
The interpersonal reactivity index. 
 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a 28-item scale that measures 
cognitive and emotional empathy using a multidimensional approach (Davis, 1980).  This 
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measure is unique because it looks at both cognitive and emotional empathy, while extant 
measures are able to examine only one form of an individual’s empathic responses 
(Davis, 1983).  The IRI is comprised of four subscales.  Each subscale consists of as 
many as seven questions.  The subscales are (a) perspective-taking (PT; how participants 
attempt to embrace the views of others), (b) fantasy (FS; how participants assume the 
perspective of fictional characters), (c) empathic concern (EC; how participants reveal 
concern and compassion for others), and (d) personal distress (PD; how participants 
express negative feelings, such as anxiety, as a result of the negative feelings of others). 
 An example of a PT question is, “I try to look at everybody’s side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision.” An example of an FS question is, “I daydream 
and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.” An example 
of an EC question is, “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate 
than me.” An example of a PD question is, “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive 
and ill-at-ease.”  
 Participants are asked to rate the extent to which the statement describes them 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale from A (does not describe me well) to E (describes me 
very well).  Scores for each subscale range from 0 to 28, and some of the items are 
reverse scored.  The IRI is not designed to offer a global measure of empathy.  Rather, 
each subscale score is examined individually to increase the precision of detecting 
different forms of empathy.  The IRI is also not designed to be interpreted in 
dichotomous terms, i.e., high versus low empathy.  Instead this inventory assesses the 
score as a continuous variable of empathy (Konrath, 2013). 
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 Although the literature about empathy, gender differences, and the measurement 
of both contains much discussion and debate, women consistently score higher in all 
subscales, consistent with much prior research.  When examining the convergent validity 
of the IRI, PT was associated with cognitive empathy, and emotional empathy was 
positively correlated with EC.  Concurrent validity was found in similarly expected ways; 
the subscales EC and PT were associated with more positive features, that is, high self-
esteem and positive social functioning (Konrath, 2013).  In terms of test-retest reliability, 
results from the IRI are statistically stable.  Davis (1980) used the IRI with a sample of 
109 undergraduate students to examine reliability over time (i.e., a lapse of 60-75 days).   
He observed correlations ranging from .61 to .79 for male students, and correlations 
ranging from .62 to .81 for female students.  There is significant evidence of the internal 
reliability of the IRI.  Researchers found that the alpha coefficients of male and female 
students never varied more than .3 from each other at any given time and that all subscale 
scores fell between .70 and .78 (Davis, 1980). 
Attitudes toward mental illness. 
 This scale consists of a two-statement measure that assesses attitudes toward 
mental illness (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention et al., 2012).  It is widely used 
in diverse populations to assess lay persons’ feelings about mental illness, is measured on 
a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Agree Strongly).  
The two statements are “Treatment can help people with mental illness lead normal lives” 
and “People are generally caring and sympathetic to people with mental illness.” This 
measure was included in the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), 
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which collects information throughout the United States on health behaviors, risks, 
prevention, and practices.  This measure has acceptable construct validity in determining 
attitudes toward recovery from mental illness (Kobau, Diiorio, Chapman, & Delvecchio, 
2010). 
Demographic information. 
 Information was gathered through a demographic questionnaire that asked 
various questions about: age, years on the force, training, and previous use of a weapon.  
Demographic questions were selected that were associated in prior research more 
generally with police use of force. 
Procedure 
 A sample of transit police officers completed a battery of questions, scales, and 
assessment materials as part of a larger host study exploring a series of Fourth 
Amendment challenges to law enforcement.  All the data collected from the larger host 
study were coded and prepared for analysis.  A smaller data set was created for this 
dissertation from the larger data set. 
Data collection took place in the police headquarters in March 2016.  This police 
department is an urban and regional transportation agency and authority.  The department 
offers public transportation ranging from buses and subways to commuter rail service.  
Participants received the questionnaires for this subset of the research program over a 
period of 4 weeks (in groups of 20 participants over the course of a month).  They were 
given an overview of the larger research initiative, at which point informed consent was 
obtained.  Participants were told that, as part of a larger police research initiative (“host 
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study”), officers would be asked to respond to a number of fact patterns regarding their 
feelings and perceptions. 
 The survey consisted of three parts.  All participants were asked to complete the 
survey in order of Parts 1, 2, and 3, without skipping or jumping sections.  In Part 1, the 
participants were given two vignettes to read with questions that needed to be answered 
related to the corresponding vignette.  They were asked to complete the PANAS 
immediately after responding to both of the use-of-force vignettes.  The second part 
contained two measures, the IRI and Attitudes Toward Mental Illness.  This section was 
intended to gain information on qualities and characteristics related to policing that were 
unique to the officer.  Last, in Part 3, participants were asked a variety of demographic 
questions related to their personal experiences. 
When completed, questionnaires were returned face down to a bin.  All 
participants received a letter describing the study and larger research program in greater 
detail, with instructions for obtaining a summary of the results, once completed, along 
with contact information to use to obtain answers to any additional questions.  
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Chapter 4.  Results 
 
Power Analysis 
With an alpha of .05 and estimating a medium effect size of .4, a total sample size 
of 140 (70 per condition) was determined to be required to obtain statistical power of .80 
for the primary hypothesis (Cohen, 1988). 
Descriptive Statistics and Randomization 
A total of 140 transit officer participants were asked to read two vignettes that 
involved hypothetical scenarios in which they were encountering an individual engaging 
in a criminal activity.  Participants were randomly assigned, in blocks of 10 (to ensure 
relatively equal group sizes), to read either two vignettes involving perpetrators 
displaying overt signs of mental illness (n = 72, 51.4% ― experimental condition) or two 
vignettes involving perpetrators engaged in the same criminal acts but not displaying any 
signs of mental illness (n = 68, 48.6% ― control condition).  As displayed in Table 1, 
study participants had a mean age of 39.77 years (SD = 9.4 years) and a mean length of 
service of 12.37 years (SD = 8.5 years).  All but two of the participants who reported their 
gender were male (98.3%, n = 118).  Of the participants, 48% (n = 60) had a formal 
record of disciplinary action, 75% (n = 98) had taken their service gun out of its holster at 
least once in the course of duty, 94% (n = 123) had presented or used a police-issued 
weapon (e.g., baton, Taser, or chemical spray) at least once in the course of duty, and 











(n = 124) 
  
       GED   1   1% 
   HS diploma 58 47% 
Associates 29 23% 
Bachelor’s 31 25% 
    Postgraduate   5   4% 
Crisis Training 
(n = 83) 
  
Yes 46 55% 
Ethnicity 
(n = 109) 
  




Other 14 13% 
Gender 
(n = 120) 
  
Male 118            98% 
Female 2 .02% 
Formally 
Disciplined  
(n = 125) 
  
Yes 60 48% 
   
Firearm Out 
(n = 131) 
  
Yes 98 75% 
 
Weapon Out 
(n = 131) 
  




(n = 117) 
  
Yes 16 14% 
   
Age  39.77 (9.4) 
Years Served  12.37 (8.5) 
Note:  GED = general equivalency diploma.  HS = high school. 
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A check of randomization revealed that the variance in these demographic 
variables was equally distributed across the two study conditions.  As shown in Table 1, 
no significant between-group effects were found for age, F(1, 110) = .84, p = .36; gender, 
χ2 (1, 140) = 2.2, p = .23; ethnicity, χ2 (2, 140) = 2.2, p = 33;  years of service, F(1, 115) = 
.92, p = .34; years of  education, χ2 (4, 140) = 3.1, p = .54; prior crisis training, χ2 (1, 140) 
= 1.3, p =18; history of formal discipline, χ2 ( 1, 140) = .62, p = .27; prior withdrawal of a 
firearm, χ2 (1, 140) = .16, p = 1.5; prior withdrawal of a weapon, χ2 (1, 140) = 0.12, p = 
.60; or personal history of mental illness, χ2 (1, 140) = .93, p = .24. 
Assumptions 
Generally, five assumptions should be satisfied for a two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA: (a) it must have a continuous dependent variable (force, negative affect), (b) it 
must have two within-subject factors where each factor consists of two or more levels, (c) 
it must not have significant outliers in any cells of the data (combinations of the two 
within-subject factors), (d) the dependent variable should be approximately normally 
distributed for each of the independent variables, and (e) variance of the differences 
between levels should be equal (i.e., assumption of homogeneity of variances). 
The first two assumptions listed were met as a result of the design.  Regarding the 
third assumption, there were no outliers as assessed by examination of the studentized 
residuals for values ± 3.  There were lower ratings of use of force for the train vignette 
for three participants, who reported their use of force as a 1 (officer presence).  In the 
Dunkin Donuts vignette, two participants reported their use of force as a 2 
(verbalization).  For the fourth assumption, the amount of force for the train vignette 
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(vignette 1) in the control condition had a skewness of -2.52 (SE = .29) and kurtosis of 
8.82 (SE = .57).  The amount of force in the train vignette in the experimental condition 
had a skewness of -2.01 (SE = .28) and kurtosis of 4.28 (SE = .56).  The amount of force 
in the Dunkin Donuts vignette for the control condition had a skewness of -1.27 (SE = 
.29) and kurtosis of 1.87 (SE = .57).  The amount of force for the experimental condition 
of the Dunkin Donuts vignette produced a skewness of -1.67 (SE = .28) and kurtosis of 
4.30 (SE = .56).  These results, in combination with visual observation of the distribution, 
indicate that the results were negatively skewed.  The two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA procedure, however, is considered relatively robust to violations of normality.  
For reasons offered by the central limit theorem, the two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA typically still provides valid results with larger sample sizes.  Regarding the 
fifth assumption, the sphericity of the interaction effect was not significant (p = .25), 
indicating that the assumption of sphericity for the two-way interaction (condition by 
vignette) was not violated. 
Hypothesis 1 
A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was conducted to 
determine whether there was a statistical significance on use of force between transit 
officers reading a vignette involving an encounter with a suspect engaging in illegal 
activity with or without overt signs of mental illness.  The independent variable included 
a between-subjects variable, signs of mental illness, and a within-subject variable, two 
different vignettes.  The dependent variable was the degree of force that was selected in 





Repeated-Measures ANOVA: Main and Interaction Effects—Use of Force 
 
Variables N df F Sig. 
Vignette X condition 140 1 1.36 .25 
Vignette  140 1 87.33 < .001 




A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was conducted to 
determine whether there was a statistical significance on negative affect between transit 
officers reading a vignette involving an encounter with a suspect engaging in illegal 
activity with or without overt signs of mental illness.  The independent variable included 
a between-subjects variable, signs of mental illness, and a within-subject variable, two 
different vignettes.   The dependent variable was officers’ degree of negative affect that 
was experienced in response to the suspect’s behavior.  An alpha level of .05 was used 
for this analysis.  Results for model assumptions of normality, homogeneity of 
covariance, and linearity were satisfactory.  There was no statistically significant 
interaction in the amount of force used between the conditions and the vignettes, F(1, 
139) = .37, p = .54 (see Figure 2).  The result of the main effect of the vignettes was 




Repeated- Measures ANOVA: Main and Interaction Effects – Negative Affect 
 
Variables N df F Sig. 
Vignette X condition 140 1   .67 .42 
Vignette 140 1 14.12 < .001 





illness”), (f) years of service, and (g) age.  As depicted in Table 4, significant positive 
correlations were found for the amount of force in the train vignette and the amount of 
force in the Dunkin Donut vignette, r = .25, p < .003; empathic concern and attitude 
toward mental illness (“Treatment can help people with mental illness lead normal 
lives”), r = 2.79, p < .001; empathic concern and attitude toward mental illness (“People 
are generally caring and sympathetic to people with mental illness”), r = .171, p < .043; 
and years of service and age, r = .847, p < .000.  Bivariate correlations were run 
individually for experimental and control conditions but revealed similar correlations 
with significance on the same variables as the entire sample.  Moderator analyses were 
not conducted because there were no significant differences in correlations across 






Inter-item Correlations: Demographic and Dependent Variables 
 
























.25** 1      
Empathic 
concern 








-.12 .02 .17* .15 1   
Years of 
service 
-.13 .02 -.12 .03 -.03 1  
Age -.11 .02 .01 .09 -.01 .85** 1 
 
aAttitudes toward MI 1 represents Question 1: “Treatment can help people with mental 
illness lead normal lives.”  
 
bAttitudes toward MI 2 represents Question 2: “People are generally caring and 
sympathetic to people with mental illness.” 
 




Chapter 5.  Discussion 
At about 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon 
and Leslie Wright were dispatched to answer a “prowler inside call.” A suspect 
pushed past the conductor on Warminster Train #402, stating that he was not 
going to pay.  He then took a seat on the train.  You, the assigned officer, were 
called to the car by the conductor and observed the suspect, who was approaching 
passengers and screaming, “I bless you as the son of God.  I forgive you, you 
must atone for your sins!” As the passengers did nothing, the suspect became 
more agitated, stuttering, spitting, and throwing his fists in the air.  When the 
suspect saw you, he took out and began waving a knife that had previously been 
concealed in his back pocket.  The suspect growled and shouted an incoherent 
string of words and positioned his body to lunge at you.  You assumed a defensive 
position after quickly moving passengers as far away from the suspect as possible.   
 Do police officers think that the use of greater force is justified with suspects who 
display signs of mental illness as compared with suspects who display no signs of mental 
illness? Do officers who read vignettes involving suspects displaying signs of mental 
illness experience a higher degree of negative affect compared to officers exposed to 
vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness? These questions 
capture the two central hypotheses in this dissertation. 
The first hypothesis predicted that officers exposed to vignettes involving 
suspects displaying signs of mental illness will use greater force compared to officers 
exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of mental illness.  However, 
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the findings failed to support this hypothesis, as officers in both conditions used similar 
levels of force, with officers in both conditions using more force in the vignette in which 
the suspect brandished a weapon (knife). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects 
displaying signs of mental illness will experience a higher degree of negative affect 
compared to officers exposed to vignettes involving suspects displaying no signs of 
mental illness.  This hypothesis was also not supported, as no between-condition 
differences were found for negative affect. 
Finally, the exploratory analyses found no significant relationship between officer 
characteristics (i.e., age, years of service, empathy, and attitudes toward mental illness) 
and use of force in either vignette. 
The assumptions behind Hypotheses 1 (H1) and 2 (H2) anticipate behavioral and 
affective variation on the part of participants in responding to vignettes in which suspects 
display overt signs of mental illness or no overt signs of mental illness.  The behavioral 
differences anticipated with H1 included the kind of variation in perceived reasonableness 
of the use of force that compensates for expected gaps in rationality found in suspects in 
the experimental condition.  H2 assumed that the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) would reveal the kind of affective differences that reflect a participant’s ability 
or inability to confront, tolerate, and accommodate behavior associated with mental 
illness.  These assumptions, and others, may have taken the form of four outcomes that 
include accommodation, which is a form of recognition of mental illness, and 
compensation, which is the calibration of force levels: Over Accommodate/Compensate; 
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Under Accommodate/Compensate; Reasonably Accommodate/Compensate; and Don’t 
Accommodate/Compensate (reflecting the results of this dissertation). 
In spite of some strong support in the literature for both H1 and H2, the results fail 
to reject the null hypothesis.  Interpretation of the results of this study show either that the 
methods and approaches to examine the alternative hypotheses are inadequate or, more 
concerning, police do not consider or take into account the mental-health status of 
suspects.  If the former, distinct lessons are to be learned from the methods used or not 
used in this study.  These lessons include considerations regarding the coding used, a 
ceiling effect from “overly severe vignettes,” vignettes that fail to capture the complexity 
of real-world interactions, and/or the fact that both vignettes involved suspects attempting 
to attack the responding officer. 
 If the latter, however, officer training and awareness of mental illness must be 
promptly and directly addressed (Morabito et al., 2012).  Police are legally obligated to 
use the amount of force “that represents the minimal amount of force necessary to reduce 
the immediate threat” (Philadelphia Police Department, 2015).  How is the threat 
assessed?  Beyond matters of training and awareness, these finding may raise significant 
legal concerns.  After all, the use of force by police is judged, at least legally, by the 
objective test (i.e., intuitions about the reasonable calculations of an average officer) of 
what “reasonable” officers would have thought and felt in like circumstances.  If officers 
do not, in fact, accommodate or compensate in reasonable ways to mental illness, little to 
no constitutional constraints will be placed on their use of force.  That is, the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution would not be offended by officer 
			USE	OF	FORCE	 																																																																																																																															54	
overcompensation (i.e., the use of too much force) and no compensation (i.e., neglecting 
the mental-health status of the suspect).  The results of this dissertation, therefore, leave 
open the possibility that the mental-health status of suspects may be entirely incidental to 
any judgment of the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of force. 
If police officers ignore the rationality of suspects with mental illness, they may 
be disregarding, more generally, the many psychological and behavioral differences 
associated with mental illnesses.  This disregard, if true, would lend support to a societal 
neglect and social stigma of mental illness (Corrigan, 2004; Corrigan & Gelb, 2006). 
Of course, use-of-force decision making should not be seen in isolation.  Instead, 
people with mental illness, from offender to complainant, victim, and person in need 
come into contact with functionaries at every stage of the criminal-justice system.  With 
each call for service, unique challenges extend the role of and challenge the capability of 
first responders.  This role and associated challenges are recognized by specific 
departmental rules and directives cautioning officers, for example, that “Suspects may be 
physically or mentally incapable of responding to police commands due to a variety of 
circumstances including but not limited to alcohol or drugs, mental impairment, medical 
conditions, or language or cultural barriers.  Officers should be mindful of this when 
making use-of-force decisions” (Philadelphia Police Department, 2015). 
One reason mental illness may not have produced the hypothesized effects is that 
officers might have, to some degree, habituated to irrational behavior.  Through 
experience interacting with people with mental illness, training, or both, police may 
already assume that many individuals act irrationally (Kaminski et al., 2004; Mulvey & 
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White, 2014).  Relatedly, the results also may be explained by the possibility that 
interactions with suspects who are mentally ill are largely indistinguishable from those 
with suspects without a mental illness (Kerr, Morabito, & Watson, 2010).  Alternatively, 
the fact that large police departments respond to thousands of calls about “emotionally 
disturbed persons” each year may result in routinized police responses to suspects 
presenting with less than rational behavior.  Routinization, consistent with the 
criminalization hypothesis, may dull, if not mute, police responses to possible resistance 
from suspects who are mentally ill (Morabito, 2007). 
The failure of support for the dissertation’s two hypotheses may be explained by 
the theory of procedural justice.  Officers certainly may extend a brand of procedural 
fairness to all suspects, including those who are mentally ill, in ways that actively 
diminish the resistance of suspects while improving overall cooperation.  Watson and 
Angell (2007) made a convincing case that suspect perceptions of fairness and justice are 
key to improved outcomes from police interactions with suspects who are mentally ill.  
These authors noted, for example, that “(I)n the content of a procedural justice 
framework, the focus is on the subjective experience of the process of the interaction with 
authority (such as ‘The officer treated me fairly’) rather than satisfaction with the 
outcome (such as ‘The officer should not have arrested me’; Watson & Angell, 2007, p. 
789). 
Upon reflection, the authors noted that officers’ use of force did not vary as a 
function of the suspect’s presentation of mental illness.  Ideally, for reasons of 
substantive fairness, police would not discriminate against suspects on the basis of their 
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mental status.  Use-of-force decisions would be made by police officers who are well 
trained and able to make force decisions based on the suspect’s mental status, level of 
resistance, and threat.  In this ideal world, mental status would be recognized as but one 
of many presenting characteristics of a suspect, not as the defining one or one that is 
guided by stigma and unjustified predispositions. 
One should note that the average number of warnings issued by officers differed 
between the train and Dunkin Donuts vignettes.  Justifiably, the average number of 
warnings was greater in the train vignette (M = 1.65) than in the Dunkin Donut vignette 
(M = 1.01) because the train vignette involved a deadly weapon.  Greater force was used 
in the train vignette, with more resistance from the suspect and with greater potential 
risks of injuries to police and others, thus justifying additional warnings.  This may seem 
counterintuitive, but additional warnings are generally given to suspects as they move up 
the force continuum. 
Study Limitations 
As with all empirical research, possible threats to internal and external validity 
must also be considered.  These threats may be magnified when analyzing secondary or 
archival data, where samples are drawn from “special” populations, and when 
psychometric measures and vignette surveys are used.  After a brief discussion of 
possible study limitations, more substantive explanations for failing to reject the null 
hypothesis will be considered.  The ways in which this research should inspire future 




One factor that may have diminished the internal validity of study findings is the 
use of vignettes.  Officers possibly may respond differently to suspect resistance in a 
vignette than they would on the scene.  Also, vignettes may fail to capture the factual or 
ecological complexity of real-world interactions between police and suspects.  These 
possibilities raise reasonable concerns about the internal and external validity of the 
findings.  To address these concerns, this study (a) relied on interrater measures of 
vignette realism by a panel of three officers from different ranks and (b) drafted vignettes 
directly from the 2015 police case files, a year-long record of all cases during which 
officers interacted with suspects with an apparent mental illness. 
Of course, no matter how factually accurate the vignettes are, police interactions 
with suspects, including those who are mentally ill, may evoke unique concerns for the 
officer’s own safety or the safety of others not evoked by the vignettes.  Actual use-of-
force decisions are made in real-world contexts that may be impossible to completely 
recreate in a vignette questionnaire, no matter how factually realistic.  However, a 
substantial body of research over more than 4 decades provides strong support for the 
value of vignette research methods, notwithstanding concerns with external validity 
(Gould, 1996; Hughes & Huby, 2004). 
Police interactions with persons who are mentally ill are increasing but are still 
relatively rare.  So, too, is the resort to more serious force, most particularly deadly force.  
For many participants, therefore, the questionnaire employed in this dissertation was 
likely entirely hypothetical.  Certainly, the ability of officers who have very limited 
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experience with mental illness inside and outside of work to differentiate between serious 
versus less-than-serious presentations of mental illness is also limited. 
Use of Self-report Measures  
In many instances, particularly when assessing potentially sensitive information, 
self-report measures may impact the validity and reliability of information obtained 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  Notably, evidence of construct validity and reliability is 
considerable for the PANAS (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988).  In 
addition, the anonymous assessment procedures used in the current study are likely to 
have mitigated some of these concerns. 
Sample/Population 
Research that considers police perceptions of a suspect’s dangerousness or 
resistance is difficult to conduct in the laboratory with college-student samples without 
significant sacrifices to external validity.  The use of any one sample raises obvious 
questions about generalizability.  This study is no different.  Because this study was 
conducted in a single city jurisdiction, with a specific sample of law enforcement 
personnel, a determination of the degree to which the findings generalize to all law 
enforcement is impossible. 
Substantive Explanations for the Null Hypothesis 
At least seven reasonable substantive explanations can be given for the study’s 
failing to reject the null hypothesis.  First, officers possibly do not interact with persons 
who are mentally ill frequently enough to recognize the signs or symptoms of mental 
illness.  Second, officers may have difficulty imagining irrational resistance and, thus, 
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may be less likely to see irrationality as a likely determinant of reasonable use of force.  
Third, officers may not receive sufficient training on de-escalation techniques.  Fourth, 
officers rarely use deadly force and, thus, may be less able to distinguish when it should 
be used.  Fifth, officers may see all suspects who are escalating their resistance to force as 
potentially irrational, whether that irrationality comes from mental illness, substance 
abuse, or psychopathy.  Sixth, given their relatively high rate of disciplinary charges, this 
sample of police officers was less capable than others of following known procedures and 
directives.  Unfortunately, the research is scant on police disciplinary measures in local 
and municipal police departments, thus making comparisons here is very difficult.   
Finally, officer use-of-force decisions may, in part, be determined by their concern for 
their own safety and the safety of others.  The mental status of the suspect may be 
significantly overshadowed by feelings of self-preservation and the desire for the safety 
of others. 
These explanations pose new questions, including whether officers who are 
trained on linear models of the force continuum need specialized training in more 
complex conceptualizations of resistance.  Will additional training in gauging justifiable 
use of force with suspects who are mentally ill result in better outcomes for both law 
enforcement and the mentally ill?  If so, would such training make law enforcement 
select lower levels of force than would be justified to accommodate irrationality?  Would 
irrationality move law enforcement to use more force than necessary to accommodate 
irrationality? Would additional police training allow officers to distinguish between and 
among serious mental illnesses and other causes of irrationality, for example, drug 
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intoxication?  Would officer discrimination of illnesses result in better outcomes? Do the 
results offer any insights into suggestions for existing crisis intervention team programs? 
These questions, individually and collectively, require additional research.  Answers to 
these questions would have significant impact on use-of-force policies and even more 
profound implications for the way in which suspects with mental illness are treated by the 
criminal-justice system. 
Relevance of the Study to the Theory and Practice of Psychology 
Police are often first responders in situations that involve individuals who are 
mentally ill.  In such situations, a lack of clinical knowledge and related training may 
combine in ways that result in injuries and the loss of life.  The deinstitutionalization of 
mental-health-care facilities, along with other factors, has put police in the position of 
making custody versus treatment decisions for persons who are mentally ill—without 
much training (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001).  Predictions of violence are very difficult to 
make, even for trained clinicians, and often result in false positives and negatives.  For 
armed law enforcement officers who are insufficiently trained, making such predictions is 
fraught with errors that have potentially grave consequences. 
The results of this dissertation suggest the value of developing the field of 
professional police psychology and the importance of increasing the number of mental-
health-care professionals on staff not only to treat officers with mental-health issues, but 




Possible Findings as Related to Future Work in the Area 
The premise of this dissertation, that linear use-of-force guidelines may lead to 
miscalculations with suspects experiencing mental illness, is concerning in several ways.   
First, public and professional recognition of the plight of persons who are mentally ill and 
untreated/unmedicated should be greater.  The inability to find effective alternative 
solutions to the deinstitutionalization of individuals who suffer from severe mental-health 
disorders is part of the problem.  The other part of the problem is that this new and 
growing class of deinstitutionalized individuals with mental illness increasingly comes 
into contact with law enforcement, putting generally unprepared and improperly trained 
police officers in the position of assessing mentally ill individuals’ rationality and risk to 
public safety and of bringing them into the criminal-justice system in a safe, helpful, and 
professional manner, often with very little or no time for consultation or second thoughts.   
Persons with mental illness often have few social or financial resources, may have 
difficulty communicating, and are often inappropriate candidates for standard criminal-
justice responses, including detention, adjudication, and incarceration.  Rather, this 
population may be good, appropriate candidates for medication and treatment in public- 
and mental-health facilities.  Second, there should be more outrage that the criminal-
justice system readily accepts large populations of individuals who are mentally ill into 
jails and prisons, thereby punishing the “mad” as the “bad.”  In addition to the potential 
risk of mistreatment by the officers and other criminal-justice stakeholders, they may also 
face the risk of harm and predation by inmates in the correctional facilities.  Third, the 
fact that this dissertation explores the “reasonableness” of using deadly force against 
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populations of untreated/unmedicated suspects who are mentally ill should lead to 
practical reforms from a greater collaboration between mental-health-care professionals 
and criminal-justice officials. 
Possible Implications Related to Diversity and/or Advocacy 
Given a firm foundation of race-based differences, one should not be surprised 
that use-of-force decisions with suspects who are mentally ill turn, at least in part, on (a) 
race-determined calculations of the value of life, (b) race-based perceptions of 
dangerousness, and (c) race-based perceptions of guilt and deservedness of punishment 
(Adler et al., 2016).  An exploration of the role of race in police use-of-force decision 
making with suspects who are mentally ill is undoubtedly important.  Innovations in 
methods used to examine race-based effects in automobile stops and stop-and-frisk 
practices should be employed in use-of-force research.  Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) 
and Ridgeway (2006), for example, found that allegations of race-based traffic stops were 
generally unsupported by a natural experiment comparing daytime and nighttime stops in 
Oakland, California, in spite of substantial anecdotal evidence to the contrary. 
Nevertheless, future research on this topic should explore the role of suspect and 
officer race, gender, age, and sexual orientation on officers’ use of force.  As discussed 
earlier, research on the relationship between suspect race and officer use of force is 
already substantial.  This work should also be extended to include officer demographics, 





 Police use-of-force decisions are important for the safety of communities and of 
officers, and as a powerful symbol of the state’s authority to administer justice and ensure 
order.  When police decisions are made with suspects who are mentally ill, their 
importance may be magnified.  The law grants significant authority to police, as agents of 
the state, to use force that is reasonable in light of suspects’ risk to others, the police, and 
themselves.  This discretion is bounded by a police officer’s experience, perceptions, and 
knowledge of the law.  Linear use-of-force continuums, regularly used in police 
academies and as part of department policies, frame actual police decision making in 
ways that are entirely rational.  The more force used that is both reasonable and justified, 
the less resistance is expected from a rational suspect.  Thus, the movement from no force 
(i.e., officer presence and verbal command) to moderate force (i.e., physical control holds 
and OC sprays), less-than-lethal force (i.e., baton and electric control weapon), and then 
deadly force is sequential and, at least on the margins, predictable.  This coordinated 
movement in both force and resistance movement, depicted in Appendix D, is reasonable 
if within the linear force bounds of F1 and F2. 
 The challenge for first responders turns on the reasonableness of decision making 
when resistance is neither sequential nor predictable.  The hypotheses examined in this 
dissertation assumed that officers would use force differentially, considering the 
rationality of the suspect as an important determinant of force levels.  However, the data 
do not support a finding that this sample of police officers recognized the appearance of 
mental illness as part of their decision-making calculus.  As discussed, this failure of 
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recognition may be an artifact or result of the methods or materials used.  If it is not, a 
number of possible interpretations were previously offered that could account for the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
A practical problem that remains concerns the status quo of use-of-force practices 
in police departments throughout the United States.  With limited training in crisis 
intervention, limited exposure strategies for de-escalating confrontations with persons 
with mental illness, and increasing numbers of calls for service involving suspects and 
complainants with mental illness, the default legal standard used to determine whether 
force is justified is an objective reasonableness test, one that considers the totality of 
circumstances. 
In theory and in practice, deficits in police training and intervention strategies 
significantly increase the range of force options F3 and F4, by setting the bar low with 
respect to what may justifiably be expected of a reasonable police officer.  The 
reasonableness standard, quite perversely, grants wide discretion for police to stray from 
the narrower band of F1 and F2.  On occasions, this increased discretion in force options 
will likely result in the use of more force than necessary, as some iconic and tragic cases 
reveal.  It may also result in other combinations of accommodation and compensation, 
equally off the mark of reasonableness.  That the mental-health community allows the 
status quo to continue without cries for reform is, quite tragically, part of the greater 
disregard of mental illness in the criminal-justice system.  There are costs to this 
disregard, in lives lost and lives changed forever.  
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